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Abstract 
Mass gatherings (MG) are characterized by the influx of large numbers of people with the need to have infrastructural changes to support these 
gatherings. Thus, Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) is critical management infrastructure for both the delivery of public 
health functions and for mounting adequate response during emergencies. The recognition of the importance of PHEOC at the leadership and 
political level is foundational for the success of any public health intervention during MG. The ability of the PHEOC to effectively function 
depends on appropriate design and infrastructure, staffing and command structure, and plans and procedures developed prior to the event. 
Multi-ministerial or jurisdictional coordination will be required and PHEOC should be positioned with such authorities. This paper outlines the 
essential concepts, elements, design, and operational aspects of PHEOC during MG. 
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Introduction 
Public health is increasingly becoming an essential 
component of the management structure of mass 
gatherings (MG). The management of public health 
functions during MG, therefore, requires unique 
management capabilities--the establishment of public 
health emergency operations centers (PHEOC). The 
effectiveness of the PHEOC was established previously 
[1]. While the term PHEOC or command center in 
public health is relatively new, the principles of 
emergency management have been applied during the 
Hajj pilgrimage for decades as the health risks during 
mass gatherings became evident. In the past few 
decades, the Hajj Health Command Center has been 
formalized. For the first time, in 2005, the International 
Health Regulations developed by the World Health 
Organization, required countries to “develop, 
strengthen, and maintain, the capacity to respond 
promptly and effectively to public health risks and 
emergencies of international concern”, and in 2013 
developed guidelines for the establishment of PHEOCs 
[2–4]. The new concept of PHEOC as a critical element 
of public health preparedness [5] has been strengthened 
recently by emerging global threats including the 2014 
West Africa Ebola Crisis, the related global response, 
and the Global Health Security Agenda [4,6–8]. Based 
on the authors’ experience in the establishment of the 
Hajj PHEOC, exposure to other major public health 
PHEOCs, and drawing from emerging discussions on 
PHEOCs, in this paper, we outline the rationale, design 
considerations, and organizational and operational 
aspects of PHEOC during mass gatherings. 
 
Rationale for PHEOC during mass gatherings 
During mass gatherings, the present health and 
support services in the host country may be adequate to 
deal with existing diseases including the occurrence of 
outbreaks. Such capacities vary depending on the 
development trajectory of countries. However, due to 
various reasons, the influx of large numbers of people 
during MGs and the need to adjust infrastructures may 
add burden in the ability to detect emerging health 
issues and carry out an effective response. First, regular 
public health functions are carried out on a 5 or 6 day 
per week schedule with regular working hours whereas 
mass gathering public health functions require 24/7 (24 
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hours a day -7 days a week) operation. Second, in non-
MG setting, separate but interconnected administrative 
units (ministries) implement various components of a 
response at their own pace matching their 
organizational capacity and operating procedures. 
There may be very limited interaction between public 
health officials and law enforcement during the non-
MG period. During an MG, however, due to the brevity 
of time and scale of response, unlike all other functions 
of traditional health sector, collaboration and 
partnerships with multiple ministries beyond the 
authority of the health ministry is required and under a 
single command structure. Third, due to the emergency 
nature of the event, practical aspects of public health 
tools used during mass gatherings may differ from that 
used in regular settings. Fourth, international MG 
creates additional challenges: a sudden increase in more 
culturally and linguistically diverse population with 
different disease epidemiology—management capacity 
for which may not exist in the regular health system. 
Finally, in the regular (non-MG) health care system in 
many developing countries, PHEOC is a new concept 
and most countries may not have experience with the 
establishment or use of a PHEOC. 
Other key challenges intrinsic to MG include high 
political visibility and political pressure (a non-MG 
health care delivery infrastructure is generally far 
removed from the political radar), and warnings and 
hoaxes requiring appropriate political and media 
responses. A PHEOC becomes the staging area for the 




The discipline dealing with the assessment, 
reduction, and avoidance of excessive risk events 
arising from natural, human-generated, or technological 
causes through an organized response. 
 
Emergency operations center (EOC) 
EOC is also known as command centers, situation 
rooms, or crisis management centers [9]. EOC is a 
physical or virtual centers where an organization 
coordinate response, recovery actions and resources 
during an emergency or a disaster [2].  
 
Incident 
“An occurrence either human caused or by natural 
phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize 
loss of life or damage to property and/or natural 
resources” [10]. 
 
The Incident Command System (ICS) 
is the multi-jurisdictional or multi-disciplinary 
response system dealing with emergency situations 
[11,12]. 
 
Essential components of emergency management: 
 PHEOC design principles, infrastructure, 
equipment and supplies 
 PHEOC staff and field responders 
 Policies, plans and procedures. 
Although in an emergency situation, event specific 
incident management systems are set up instantly, the 
development trajectory of a permanent preparedness 
capacity generally follows a stepped approach.  The 
first priority for establishment of a permanent 
preparedness infrastructure is political engagement, 
information sharing, and technical discourse among 
policy makers. These activities can be complemented 
by development of systems that includes policies and 
guidelines, establishment of infrastructure including 
physical space and communication redundancies, and 
manpower development [13,14]. Once these steps are 
realized preparedness systems can be operationalized. 
 
Principles of PHEOC design 
PHEOC is an important structure to coordinate 
activities during either small emergencies or large-scale 
disasters [15]. PHEOC is designed to be operational 
during emergencies including at a time when normal 
operational capacity is non-existent as experienced 
during Hurricane Katrina in the United States [16–18]. 
Further, a perfectly established PHEOC may suffer 
from the impact of another event or emergencies such 
as aftershocks or flooding after an earthquake. These 
challenges are the rationale for the five primary 
considerations for the design and construction of a new 
Emergency Operations Center: Survivability, 
Redundancy, Communications, Flexibility and Open 
Architecture, and Security [19]. These plans are 
imperative irrespective of the temporary nature of the 
PHEOC during a mass gathering.  
 
Survivability 
It is critical that an PHEOC created for a mass 
gathering remains operational including during a 
natural catastrophe, accidents, or terrorist events when 
the PHEOC functions are most at need. It is important 
to have any PHEOC operation to be located at another 
facility with the same capacity and technology to avoid 
any PHEOC disadvantage.  The New York City Office 
of Emergency Management (OEM) had this experience 
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when their PHEOC was affected during the World 
Trade Center attack [19].  
Although we may not have a choice of locations, 
ideally, the PHEOC should be located in a safe building 
to avoid any hazard [19]. There should be separation 
from highways, railroads, pipelines, hazardous material 
sites, and the like. It is important to examine the 
location of the PHEOC and to take necessary measures 
protecting the facility from natural and artificial 
disasters, and from airborne hazards. 
 
Redundancy 
Redundancy is an important factor for the center 
survivability. However, having multiple backup 
systems is usually challenging due to financial 
constraints.  In an electric power surge in 2003, there 
was an increase in the human exposure and information 
calls in a poison center calling for a communication 
system redundancy, and an increase in the back-up 
power supply [20]. In New York, the availability of 
resources served as an excellent substitute for 
redundancy of personnel, equipment and space [21]. 
PHEOC operations are technology dependent and 
electronic systems require air-conditioning to keep 
them functioning. 
Therefore, the availability of generators to assure 
continuity in electricity supply is important. 
Irrespective of the existence of electronic documents, 
paper copies of some essential documents including 
standard operating procedures, emergency medication 
descriptions, and telephone numbers of core staff 
should be prepared and made available. Essential 
supplies such as fuel, water, and ready to eat meals are 
other supplies that should be available.  The optimal 
days for which supplies should be considered was 
suggested to be three days and might be as long as 7-10 
days in the case of PHEOC catastrophic events. [19]. 
 
Communications 
An important role of the PHEOC is to maintain 
clear and updated information about the incident or the 
disaster. Effective communication is mandatory to keep 
the public trust in the messages and in the function of 
the PHEOC [22]. Thus, multiple communication 
systems are required to meet this objective such as 
phones, and radio systems. As the center of 
communication in the PHEOC may also be affected and 
get lost [23]. An advanced WiFi-based network was 
designed to meet the needs of karge scale medical 
response system [24]. It is important to integrate the 
best communication practices in the PHEOC [25]. The 
use of electronic based system for data collection is 
more efficient than paper-based systems and reduce 
latency while increasing the quality of information [26].  
During the 2012 Hajj, digital pens were introduced to 
convert data from conventional paper-based system into 
digitalized display [27,28]. The information technology 
system captures data, analyzes the data and displays 
them at the Hajj Command and Control Center [27]. 
 
Flexibility and Open Architecture 
As much as possible, given the need for surge 
capacity, it is important to anticipate surge in staffing 
and technology in the design. Given the rapid changes 
in technology, design flexibility is needed in case of 
increased operations and the addition of new 
technology [9]. Open architecture is the norm for 
PHEOC, so that space can be configured based upon 
needs. Also, open architecture promotes instant in-
person communication among staff during an event. 
 
Security 
PHEOCs may be primary or secondary targets for 
terror attacks or may be involved in collateral damage 
[12,23]. Also, given that PHEOC may be the only entity 
associated with the government that functions, PHEOC 
may be target for mob violence in times of crisis. 
Layered levels of security allow operationalization 
security to match threat levels. Basic level of security 
may be in place when the threat level is low and 
increased incrementally to match threat levels.  It is 
important to have a secure access control utilizing 
fences, electronic gates, security checkpoints and 
biometric devices. 
 
Physical layout of PHEOC 
The size of PHEOCs may vary considerably by the 
size of the mass gathering event. Irrespective of the 
space dimensions, it would be useful to consider the 
basic PHEOC layout approaches including the 
Boardroom, Mission Control, Marketplace, Bull's-Eye 
or Virtual models. The underlying philosophy of any 
lay out should be ease of function of an PHEOC- ease 
of communication (technological and in person), easy 
assembly or convening of multidisciplinary teams, ease 
of sharing coordination information, and concentrate 
command structure activities in a visibly manageable 
location  [8,14,29–31]  For example, if watch functions, 
logistics, and field operations are accommodated in 
independent buildings or floors or separated by 
divisions, coordination can take longer time than if it 
was in the same space.   The layout of the PHEOC room 
may take the form of a boardroom, mission control, 
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marketplace or Bull’s eye design.  The different design 
indicates a selective indication.  For example, board 
room design indicates a collaborative interactive design 
and is ideal when the group is small.  The marketplace 
design allows that each small table be assigned a 
specific task.  
Virtual arrangements may never be considered an 
alternative to a physical PHEOC, but could serve as a 
supplement enabling surge capacity, or while a physical 
PHEOC is in development.   The challenges include the 
reliability and security of technology, and the difficulty 
in managing group processes online. 
 
Staffing of PHEOC 
The generic organogram of PHEOC is designed to 
enable the three generally accepted concept of 
operations: a single decision making authority (strategy 
and policy), to operationalize (coordination), 
implementation (tactical) of response that matches the 
scale and scope of the event (Figure 1). The basic model 
can be expanded to accommodate all relevant 
disciplines without the need to create additional 
leadership tracks that becomes necessary. The roles and 
responsibilities of key sections of the PHEOC (Table 1) 
enable the incident command to optimize the response 
and communication plan. PHEOC may not be 
responsible for executing all the elements of the 
response that is required (for example border control); 
however, PHEOC provides the guidance. Therefore, 
PHEOC should have the authority to effectively work 
with various ministries or administrative units to assure 
that all response activities are implemented [22,32–34]. 
Science response sections may be needed if faced with 
emerging disease threats or other events of significance 
that are beyond the general epidemiology of routine 
mass gathering related health consultations. The 
science team may include subject matter experts from 
epidemiology and surveillance, laboratory, disease 
specialties (for example, infectious diseases, 
environmental and occupational), medical care and 
medical countermeasures, and international disease 
control coordination. Together, these experts can 
provide technical guidance to the incident manager on 
scientific interventions, prepare and present data for the 
incident management plan, and assure scientific basis 
of response. Delivery of non-medical measures is 
normally delegated to respective ministries such as the 
defence or police sector for crowd control and 
distribution of essential commodities. 
Public information is critical to response 
management [13,25,26,32]. The public health 
information officer is charged with determining current 
media presence and establishing contact with the media, 
determine and comply with public information 
processes, converting scientific information to a format 
that is useful to the media for public release, and 
providing proactive and regular press releases and 
media briefings that can help reduce rumors and 
misassumptions by the public.  
The safety officer role is to identify threats to the 
response infrastructure, identifying and monitoring 
hazardous situations associated with the event or the 
Figure 1. Structure of Public Health Emergency Operations 
Center (PHEOC) 
Table 1. Functions of core leadership of an emergency operations center 
Function Description 
Incident Command / EOC Manager  
• Establishes incident objectives, strategies, and priorities.  
• Assumes overall responsibility for the incident. 
Operations 
• Determines tactics and resources for achieving objectives. 
• Directs the response. 
Planning 
• Collects and analyzes information. 
• Tracks resources. 
• Maintains documentation. 
Logistics • Obtains and provides resources and needed services. 
Finance/Administration 
• Accounts for expenditures, claims, and compensation. 
• Enables procurement of needed resources. 
 
Elachola et al. – PHEOC in mass gatherings       J Infect Dev Ctries 2016; 10(8):785-790. 
789 
response, and ensure that adequate levels of protective 
equipment are available and being used properly. 
 
Policies, plans and procedures 
Documents that should be prepared in advance prior 
to the event include: 
 Emergency management plans 
 Procedures 
An emergency event is not the time to prepare an 
emergency management plan. Emergency management 
plans should be prepared prior to a mass gathering and 
made available to all staff members at the PHEOC, 
generally included in the share drives of the computers 
they are assigned to.  Availability of finalized 
contingency plans and functional plans as their 
appendices can help avoid panic and confusion. 
Functional plans should offer continuity measures, 
address cross-cutting issues including communications 
and vulnerable population challenges, and mission 
specific as to mitigation or risk and recovery of 
normalcy. Procedures are documents outlining how to 
consistently execute tasks and may be called standard 
operating procedures [SOP]. They should cover, 
purpose, scope, responsibilities and job descriptions of 
staff, tasks and standards of performance, and 
checklists for various activities [1,14]. 
Documents that are prepared during events needing 
emergency operation center activation include: 
 Incident action plans 
 Situation reports 
Incident action plans identify tactical 
implementation steps for a response for a defined 
operational period. As a minimum, they contain, critical 
situation updates, response strategies, response tactics, 
resources, logistics procedures, and incident map. 
Situation reports are documents that provide situational 
awareness to leadership and stakeholders. These reports 
document response actions taken, current 
epidemiological information, and proposed activities 
until the next reporting period. 
 
Conclusion 
Significant amount of advocacy and engagement 
would be needed to internalize the concept of PHEOC 
as a permanent institution within the MOH frame work, 
especially for mass gatherings. An PHEOC at mass 
gatherings can only be as strong as the surveillance and 
laboratory systems in the country and at the event and 
the ability of the PHEOC to effectively liaise with these 
entities on a timely manner [35]. It is also important that 
such PHEOC coordinate activities nationally, locally 
and internationally to achieve the desired goals [33]. 
During the SARS epidemic, mobilization of teams from 
the USA provided assistance to the involved countries 
[34]. Therefore, a good understanding of the rationale 
and functions of the PHEOC and directives to enhance 
the operational aspects is critical among all entities of 
the administrative sectors of a mass gathering. PHEOCs 
are only a formalized and developed staging area to 
manage a crisis and only functions well if the support 
infrastructure is available. Established PHEOCs 
improves the capacity of mass gathering management 
to effectively respond to public health crisis that 
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